Este trabalho procura mapear, a partir de um estudo bibliográfico, a genealogia enquanto referencial teórico metodológico pós-estruturalista. Como resultado, observa-se que a genealogia aparece de forma contínua e com muitas similaridades em Nietzsche, Foucault e Deleuze, contudo, na educação trata-se ainda de uma perspectiva teórica metodológica pouco explorada. São elementos da genealogia: questionar o conhecimento, o saber e as verdades; questionar quem as produzem e em que condições, fazendo emergir as relações de poder que as tornam possíveis; por fim, entrar (...) no campo da genealogia é colocar em foco saberes antes não considerados, é trazer à tona o marginal e o impensado. Ce travail a comme objectif de cartographier, à partir d’une étude bibliographique, la généalogie en tant que référence théorico-méthodologique poststructuraliste. L’on a par conséquent observé que la généalogie apparaît de façon continue et avec nombre de similitudes chez Nietzsche, Foucault et Deleuze. Toutefois, en éducation, il s’agit encore d’une perspective théorique peu exploitée. Font partie de la généalogie les éléments suivants : remettre en question la connaissance, le savoir et les vérités ; s’intéresser à ceux qui les produisent et dans quelles conditions, mettant ainsi en lumière les rapports de pouvoir qui les rendent possibles ; et, enfin, mettre en relief des savoirs auparavant non pris en compte, faire émerger le marginal et l’impensé. (shrink)

Este artigo investe na ideia de que a infância é um dispositivo histórico do poder. Tem-se como referência analítica Michel Foucault, que concebe a noção de dispositivo em suas discussões a respeito da sexualidade. A hipótese geradora é a de que, a partir do momento em que a criança se torna um dos grupos estratégicos do dispositivo da sexualidade, produz-se sobre ela um conjunto heterogêneo de regimes de verdades e práticas que configura uma maneira de ser e ter uma infância, (...) influindo significativamente nas perspectivas pedagógicas modernas. Dialogando com Deleuze, Agamben e Veyne, considera-se que todo dispositivo possui: linhas de visibilidade e de enunciação que são, respectivamente, máquinas de “fazer ver” e de “fazer falar” ; linhas de força, que sustentam os campos de visibilidade e os regimes de enunciabilidade; e linhas de subjetivação que são, segundo Deleuze a dimensão do “si próprio” e que configuram o sujeito infantil. Apresenta-se três grupos de práticas articuladas às estas características do dispositivo: as práticas pedagógicas, as práticas divisórias e identitárias de gênero e de sexualidade e as práticas médicas. Observa-se que, para Foucault, o dispositivo da sexualidade disciplina os corpos, regula e normatiza a população, regulamenta o prazer e os saberes sobre o sexo, e, além disso, ocupa-se, por meio desse regime sobre o sexo, da preservação da espécie humana. A infância como dispositivo, na perspectiva ora apresentada neste artigo, também regulamenta a criança, constituindo-a em “sujeito infantil”, estabelecendo uma pedagogia e uma ciência que compuseram o pensamento pedagógico moderno sobre e para infância, ocupando-se também da preservação e da manutenção dessa espécie outra, a criança. Palavras-chave: Infância. Educação. Foucault. Dispositivo. (shrink)

O artigo se propõe a pensar o retorno dos adolescentes às escolas após a pandemia fazendo a articulação entre conceitos psicanalíticos e a importância da escola na transição que a adolescência representa para a constituição psíquica do sujeito. A partir de uma experiência de pesquisa-extensão em uma escola com estudantes do Ensino Médio, pensamos sobre como o laço social contemporâneo impacta os modos de subjetivação e a educação, relacionando-o ao mal-estar nos estudantes adolescentes nos contextos educativos brasileiros. Além disso, a (...) dimensão da temporalidade tanto a própria da adolescência, quanto da escola e da pandemia que lhe atravessam foram tomadas como direcionamentos sendo o artigo dividido três partes: tempo na pandemia, tempo da escola e o tempo da adolescência. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)

Nonetheless, psychoanalytic feminist theory can offer a new interpretive strategy for deconstructing her equally famous opposition between the social and the ...

This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully included in its philosophical foundations. The respective chapters share new insights on art, media, psychic systems and technology, while also presenting new ways of articulating the concept of the virtual with regard to the main premises of Western thought. Given its thematic scope, this (...) book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions. (shrink)

In their paper, Romanis and Adkins delve into the potential impact of artificial amnion and placenta technology (AAPT) on cases of pregnancy loss1 that do not involve procreative loss. First, they call for more recognition of the negative feelings a person might have due to the premature end of their pregnant state. They claim that, should AAPT minimise concerns about prematurity as anticipated, individuals might feel pressured to opt for partial ectogestation to preserve their or their fetus’ well-being; moreover, they (...) point out that the feelings of loss in the context of AAPT are likely to be worse than the ones reported in neonatal intensive care units cases. Finally, they advocate for care pathways focusing on how the transfer of a fetus to the AAPT could affect the pregnant person, with particular attention to managing the grief potentially caused by the pregnancy loss. I praise the authors for such a call to action—especially since partial ectogestation is expected to become a reality in the short-term future—and I share their demands for additional and more attentive care of (formerly) pregnant patients. However, I am concerned that their approach is so focused on negative feelings towards pregnancy loss that it risks becoming …. (shrink)

A student's future as a knowledge worker (one who "thinks for a living" with the task of problem solving) is the starting point of this book. With this in mind, the book combines a review of philosophical positions and problems with practical examples and perspectives gained from everyday challenges faced by knowledge workers in their businesses and organizations. Through the use of summative chapters, highlighted key concepts, questions for reflection, and illustrative examples on how to work with the theories presented, (...) the book provides a clear and accessible introduction to this challenging subject. Philosophy of Science primarily addresses students studying language, communication, marketing, economics, and management. However, the survey of the theoretical schools of thought - as well as the discussions on research ethics and the role of research in society - will be equally relevant for other students in the humanities and the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more (which is not a (...) realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription. (shrink)

Neural devices have the capacity to enable users to regain abilities lost due to disease or injury – for instance, a deep brain stimulator (DBS) that allows a person with Parkinson’s disease to regain the ability to fluently perform movements or a Brain Computer Interface (BCI) that enables a person with spinal cord injury to control a robotic arm. While users recognize and appreciate the technologies’ capacity to maintain or restore their capabilities, the neuroethics literature is replete with examples of (...) concerns expressed about agentive capacities: A perceived lack of control over the movement of a robotic arm might result in an altered sense of feeling responsible for that movement. Clinicians or researchers being able to record and access detailed information of a person’s brain might raise privacy concerns. A disconnect between previous, current, and future understandings of the self might result in a sense of alienation. The ability to receive and interpret sensory feedback might change whether someone trusts the implanted device or themselves. Inquiries into the nature of these concerns and how to mitigate them has produced scholarship that often emphasizes one issue – responsibility, privacy, authenticity, or trust – selectively. However, we believe that examining these ethical dimensions separately fails to capture a key aspect of the experience of living with a neural device. In exploring their interrelations, we argue that their mutual significance for neuroethical research can be adequately captured if they are described under a unified heading of agency. On these grounds, we propose an “Agency Map” which brings together the diverse neuroethical dimensions and their interrelations into a comprehensive framework. With this, we offer a theoretically-grounded approach to understanding how these various dimensions are interwoven in an individual’s experience of agency. (shrink)

This paper defends Musical Stage Theory as a novel account of the ontology of musical works. Its main claim is that a musical work is a performance. The significance of this argument is twofold. First, it demonstrates the availability of an alternative, and ontologically tenable, view to well-established positions in the current debate on musical metaphysics. Second, it shows how the revisionary approach of Musical Stage Theory actually provides a better account of the ontological status of musical works.

Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s objections against the possibility of a science of aesthetics were influential on different sides of the analytic/continental divide. Heidegger’s anti-scientism leads him to an alētheic view of artworks which precedes and exceeds any possible aesthetic reduction. Wittgenstein also rejects the relevance of causal explanations, psychological or physiological, to aesthetic questions. The main aim of this paper is to compare Heidegger with Wittgenstein, showing that: there are significant parallels to be drawn between Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s anti-scientism about aesthetics, (...) and that their anti-scientism leads both towards partly divergent criticisms of what I will call ‘aestheticism’. The divergence is mainly due to a broader metaphilosophical disagreement concerning appeals to ordinary language. Thus situating the two philosophers’ positions facilitates a possible critical dialogue between analytic and continental approaches in aesthetics. (shrink)

Anche se siamo comunemente abituati a pensare alla scienza come a un qualcosa di assolutamente atemporale e indipendente da tutto, in realtà essa è profondamente influenzata dalla cultura e dalla società del tempo in cui vive. Infatti né la scienza è isolabile dalla società, né la società è isolabile dalla scienza, tanto meno come si sta configurando oggi. Per approfondire questi aspetti, esistono però due visioni antagoniste che bisogna superare: secondo la visione scolastica, retaggio del positivismo ottocentesco ancora molto diffuso (...) fra scienziati e pubblico di non esperti, la scienza è conoscenza senza soggetto conoscente. All'opposto, la visione cinica della scienza, sull'onda di talune elaborazioni della sociologia della scienza, la riduce a nient'altro che a una costruzione di soggetti che partecipano al gioco scientifico, una cultura come altre e da "mediare", e comunque una conoscenza relativa, se non frutto di una costruzione puramente soggettiva, arbitraria, ideologica. Un'analisi della costituzione sociale della scienza può, invece, mirare a un'indagine scientifica sulla scienza proprio configurando una relatività della conoscenza che supera sia l'assolutismo idealistico sia il relativismo soggettivistico. (shrink)

No Tratado político, Espinosa, ao primeiro movimento do texto, faz dura crítica àqueles que criaram utopias ao tratarem da política. Tais filósofos, afirma, por tomarem os homens não pelo que são, mas pelo que gostariam que fossem, conceberam uma forma de política que nunca pôde ser posta em aplicação. Tese muito próxima à de Maquiavel, presente em O Príncipe, segundo a qual, para escrever coisa útil neste campo, deve-se ir direto alla verità effettuale della cosa che alla immaginazione di essa. (...) Não casualmente, portanto, no Capítulo V do Tratado político, último parágrafo, Espinosa usa os termos ‘agudíssimo’ e ‘prudentíssimo’ ao se referir ao florentino. Há mais Maquiavel em Espinosa para além das citações elogiosas? O artigo procurará tratar desta questão ao mostrar alguns traços comuns às respectivas filosofias políticas. Ao que indicam as fontes primárias e alguns comentadores, Espinosa teria se apropriado, e reconceitualizado, à sua maneira, teses-chave do florentino para escrever suas obras, em particular o Tratado político. (shrink)

No primeiro movimento o artigo analisa, em panorama, a ontologia espinosana. Após, mostra como, do interior dos conceitos presentes na ontologia, derivam os de homem, desejo, alegria e tristeza, esperança e medo, segurança e desespero, ação e paixão. Da relação entre ontologia, homens e desejo – bem como dos demais afetos –, são extraídas, em breves considerações, algumas teses políticas de Espinosa. Levanta-se, neste movimento argumentativo, a hipótese de que as teses políticas espinosanas derivam de sua ontologia e de sua (...) concepção de homem como desejo e variação de potência. O conceito de desejo é analisado à luz da variação de potência e do tema do direito natural, o qual, em Espinosa, se identifica a potência. Quando das breves derivações à política, algumas teses hobbesianas – relacionadas aos temas da multidão, povo, representação, direito natural, estado civil, etc. – são trazidas à argumentação para que se mostre, por contraste, o peso das inovações espinosanas. (shrink)

With the six volumes of the Writings edited by the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University since 1982, the monumental work of Charles S. Peirce has finally received the care, respect, and love that it deserves. The sixth volume, object of attention of this review, represents a thorough selection and edition of Peirce's writings from 1886 to 1890.

Despite the recent upsurge of interest in the investigation of creativity, the question of how to measure creativity is arguably underdiscussed. The aim of this paper is to address this gap, proposing a multidimensional account of creativity which identifies problem-solving, evaluation, and naivety as measurable features that are common among creative processes. The benefits that result from the adoption of this model are twofold: integrating discussions on creativity in various domains and offering the tools to assess creativity across systems of (...) different kinds. By situating creativity within this framework, I aim to contribute to a non-anthropocentric, more comprehensive understanding of the notion, and to debates on natural and artificial creativity. (shrink)

The problem of intentional inexistence arises because the following (alleged) intuitions are mutually conflicting: it seems that sometimes we think about things that do not exist; it seems that intentionality is a relation between a thinker and what such a thinker thinks about; it seems that relations entail the existence of what they relate. In this paper, I argue for what I call a radical relationist solution. First, I contend that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the (...) existence of their relata are wanting. In this regard, I defend a kind of pluralism about relations according to which more than one kind of relation involves non-existents. Second, I contend that there are reasons to maintain that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. More accurately, I contend that the radical relationist solution is to be preferred to both the intentional content solution (as developed by Crane) and the adverbial property solution (as developed by Kriegel). Finally, I argue that once the distinction between thinking “X” and thinking about X has been drawn, the radical relationist solution can handle issues like ontological commitment, substitutivity failure, scrutability, and non-specificity. (shrink)

This paper explores how a new theory on the ontology of musical works, Musical Stage Theory, can address the problem of change in musical works. A natural consequence of the ontological framework of this theory is that musical works change intrinsically through a change in the sonic-structural properties of performances. From this a surprising consequence follows: everyone can change a musical work. Still, it seems that some changes matter more than others. The article offers a revisionary reply to this concern (...) by arguing that normative change is not a change in the ontological nature of the work but rather in its authenticity conditions. (shrink)

According to some Philosophy for Children theorists, the pedagogy of the Community of Inquiry hinges upon the acceptance of a pragmatist epistemology. The underlying idea is that it is possible to participate, and to justify participation, in a community of inquiry only if some pragmatist view of truth and knowledge is true and accepted by the participants engaged in dialogue. In this article we argue that this claim is false. In this way, we want to free the pedagogy of the (...) Community of Inquiry from some epistemological assumptions that we regard as unwarranted. To support our contention, we shall highlight two distinctions that are important in order to appreciate the connection between epistemology and education: first, the distinction between the disposition of intellectual humility and the belief in fallibilism; second, the belief in the existence of Cartesian certainties and the attitude of psychological certainty. Finally, we also argue that to vindicate dialogic inquiry it is neither necessary to adopt a pragmatist theory of truth, nor is it necessary to regard warranted judgement as the primary aim of inquiry. In contrast, we argue that truth is the aim of inquiry, and so is the aim of children when they participate in a dialogic inquiry. In this way we also suggest a justification of philosophy with children that does not instrumentalize it. (shrink)

In recent years, Brentano’s theory of consciousness has been systematically reassessed. The reconstruction that has received the most attention is the so-called identity reconstruction. It says that secondary consciousness and the mental phenomenon it is about are one and the same. Crucially, it has been claimed that this thesis is the only one which can make Brentano’s theory immune to what he considers the main threat to it, namely, the duplication of the primary object. In this paper, I argue that (...) the identity reconstruction is untenable, and I defend an alternative, which I name the unity reconstruction. According to the unity reconstruction, secondary consciousness is a real part of the mental phenomenon it is about, and hence is distinct from it. I contend that this thesis does not in itself lead to the duplication of the primary object, and that what should be blamed is rather a controversial thesis about the intentional structure of secondary consciousness—a thesis which Brentano ultimately abandoned. (shrink)

Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is -- a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for (...) our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? Cuts and Clouds presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original essays on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts. (shrink)

In A Matter of Principle, Ronald Dworkin discusses the role a political morality should play in decisions about when the law should be obeyed and enforced, and even what law is. Noticing that liberalism was once a quasi-consensus theory in Great Britain and the United States – and, therefore, a natural candidate to that role in those countries – Dworkin argues that the loss of that status is due to an alleged failure of liberal political theorists to identify a kind (...) of egalitarianism as the constitutive principle on which liberalism is based. My aim in this paper is to advance arguments against such an influential claim that a certain egalitarianism would be the constitutive principle of political liberalism. (shrink)

As a positive thesis, philosophical anarchism claims that political authority is always at odds with practical rationality insomuch as authoritative directives are best analysed as content-independent reasons. The aim of this paper is to clarify the metaethical assumptions behind such a claim. Since philosophical anarchists reject as irrational the possibility that an agent can follow content-independent reasons issued by another agent, emphasising agents’ responsibility to assess the content of every directive before acting in conformity with it, it is safe to (...) say that philosophical anarchists must be cognitivist in metaethics. At the very least, were there no right or wrong answers to questions such as “what does one have reason to do in these circumstances?”, answers such as “one should follow authoritative directives” would be as good as any other. However, philosophical anarchism requires much more than metaethical cognitivism; indeed, it requires a very specific (and ambitious) type of cognitivism. I intend to show which one. (shrink)

It is safe to say that the main line of criticism against the reading of Critical Philosophy as Transcendental Semantics is that Kant would be concerned about semantic problems only on Critique of Pure Reason so that such reading would not make sense beyond that work. In this paper, I describe Transcendental Semantics in short words and analyze at length Kant’s theory of concepts on Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason in order to make a suggestion: every concept has (...) to attend the demands of Transcendental Semantics to be called a concept in critical sense.A principal linha da crítica contra a leitura da filosofia crítica como semântica transcendental afirma que Kant teria trabalhado sobre problemas semânticos apenas na Crítica da razão pura, assim sendo, não faria sentido ultrapassar esse limite com aquela intepretação. Neste artigo, descrevo a semântica transcendental em poucas palavras e analiso a teoria dos conceitos de Kant na Analítica transcendental da Crítica da razão pura para oferecer a seguinte observação: para atender as demandas da semântica transcendental todo conceito tem de ser chamado de conceito em sentido crítico. (shrink)

1. In the last decade, technological systems based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) architectures entered our lives at an increasingly fast pace. Virtual assistants facilitate our daily tasks, recom...

O objetivo do presente artigo é defender as seguintes teses. Em primeiro lugar, as teorias da justiça de Habermas e Rawls devem ser vistas como duas versões do construtivismo kantiano, entendido como abordagem metaética que pretende reunir anti-realismo e cognitivismo forte. Em segundo lugar, o contraste com o “construtivismo reconstrutivista” de Habermas ajuda a esclarecer de que modo a teoria de Rawls atende à pretensão de universalidade própria do cognitivismo forte. Ao realçar o fato de que o construtivismo de Rawls (...) está baseado no trabalho reflexivo da consciência individual, o contraste com Habermas permite compreender em que sentido os conceitos de equilíbrio reflexivo e consenso sobreposto designam um ideal com pretensão de validade universal, o que desmente o particularismo implicado nas interpretações coerentistas e relativistas destes conceitos. (shrink)

Partindo da noção de discurso de Michel Foucault buscamos pontuar os efeitos das falas comumente admitidas sobre o(a) professor(a) nos meios sociais e as formas como essas falas corroboram a instituição da figura do(a) bom(boa) professor(a). Para tanto recorremos aos textos publicados na seção "Obrigado, professor" da revista Nova Escola, sobre os quais empreendemos nossa análise.

Este é um estudo sobre a mediação da cultura no processo de compreensão e interpretação das normas jurídicas na determinação de seu significado e alcance de sua aplicação concreta, com base no estudo da obra Verdade e Método, de Hans-Georg Gadamer, analisa-se o papel da cultura no procedimento hermenêutico jurídico, tanto do ponto de vista do intérprete, quanto do destinatário da norma jurídica, onde o jurista entra no jogo da interpretação da norma, com o conjunto de preconceitos proporcionado pela tradição, (...) tendo um horizonte que deve fundir-se com o horizonte do caso concreto, para produzir simultaneamente uma compreensão e interpretação da norma, que permita resolver o caso concreto, por uma solução interpretativa criativa que se manifesta através da linguagem, que no que lhe concerne é um produto cultural que permite a compreensão e expressão do pensamento humano em diálogo até com outras culturas, para que a cultura seja o palco, o horizonte onde se dá o processo histórico de formação e aplicação do ordenamento jurídico. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEcumenical Alethic Pluralism is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as (...) it involves a reconfiguration of the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists. (shrink)